undertake original analysis of the rulings in CGH"s data set. The analysis shows conclusively that the threat of override is not credible, and that the legal system is activated, rather than paralyzed, by non-compliance. Unlike CGH, we also explore what happened when MSG sought to override the Court: they failed. Although CGH do not test any hypothesis derived from Intergovernmentalism or Neofunctionalism, we organize a straightforward contest between the rival theories. In a head-to-head showdown, Neofunctionalism wins in a landslide. Finally, the analysis provides support for the view that the ECJ engages in "majoritarian activism." CGH"s most robust finding is that when Member States urge the Court to censor a defendant State for non-compliance, the ECJ tends to do so. In such cases, MSGs work to reinforce the Court"s authority, not to "constrain" it.
The paper also has relevance for judicial politics in the two other international regimes that today have serious claims to be considered "constitutional" in some meaningful sense: the World Trade Organization (WTO), 10 and the European Convention on Human Rights. 11 The
Appellate Body of the WTO [WTO-AB] and the European Court of Human Rights [ECHR] are
both Trustee courts under the criteria laid out in the next section. We take up judicial politics under conditions of Trusteeship in international regimes again in the conclusion.
Trusteeship, Override, and Compliance
See the paper: "Trustee Courts and the Evolution of International Regimes: The Politics of Majoritarian Activism in the ECHR, the EU, and the WTO," available on SSRN.
Social scientists have produced more sophisticated research on the ECJ than on any other judicial body in the world, with the exception of the United States Supreme Court. Since the early-1990s, most of this research has deployed some version of delegation theory, the core of as when the Principals adopt relatively open-ended, or "incomplete," legal norms. In this view, the Treaties, and much secondary legislation, are "incomplete contracts" among the MSGs that the Court completes, through interpretation and application, as conditions change. While the authority delegated to the ECJ is vast, the decision-rule governing override (unanimity) restricts the Principals" control ex post. As important, a Trustee court possesses the capacity to expand or contract its own authority: the ECJ is the authoritative interpreter of the scope of its own jurisdiction.
Mapping a court"s zone of discretion, of course, does not tell us what the judges will actually do with their powers. Nonetheless, we can predict that a Trustee court, rather than the Contracting States, will dominate the institutional evolution of the regime in so far as three conditions are met. First, the court must have a steady case load. If potential litigants refuse to activate the court, judges will accrete no influence over the evolution of the regime. Second, once activated, the court must resolve these disputes, while giving defensible reasons for its decisions. If it does, one output of judging will be the production of case law, a formal record of how the law has been interpreted and applied. The third condition is that a minimally robust conception of precedent must develop within the system. Those who are governed by the law must accept that legal meanings are (at least partly) constructed through judicial interpretation and lawmaking, and use or refer to relevant case law in their future decision-making. To the extent that these three conditions are met, judicial review and the regime"s law can be considered to be "effective." Put differently, where these conditions are met, Trusteeship will produce a situation of "structural judicial supremacy." In this mode of governance, the court"s jurisprudence will organize the processes through which the regime evolves; and judicial lawmaking will be "sticky," in that outcomes will be relatively immune to change except through rounds of future adjudication.
For present purposes, two implications of this discussion deserve emphasis. First, a
Trustee court has little reason to fear reversal on the part of the Contracting States. In international regimes, the "Principal" is not a unified entity, but is instead a composite of a multiple of States whose Governments will exhibit divergent interests on any important policy matter on which the regime"s court takes a position. To the extent that this statement is true, the threat of override will not be credible. Second, in a situation of structural judicial supremacywhere the effectiveness criteria of the judicial review of a regime"s law have been met -the notion of "non-compliance" must cover politics that fall outside the dimension constituted by a
State"s decision "not to comply." In the EU, the WTO, and the Convention regimes, noncompliance with the regime"s law generates case load; cases have provoked expansive judicial lawmaking; and these new interpretations regularly put States out of compliance, generating new rounds of litigation. Non-compliance with rulings on the part of any State will not threaten the system as long as the three criteria for effectiveness continue to be met. It follows that our notion of compliance must include the various ways in which States adapt to the court"s jurisprudence, not just with respect to their national law and practices, but also to how they tailor litigation strategies to the court"s jurisprudence. When States defend positions on the basis of the regime"s case law, for example, they legitimize that law and the court in a powerful waythrough use.
The European Court of Justice: Trusteeship Constrained?
In Among scholars who have done empirical work on the ECJ and the EU"s legal system, there is broad consensus on the view that Court"s rulings are insulated from Member State override. 16 The underlying rationale is straightforward: for any controversial issue on which the Court will take a legal position, the MSGs will be divided and unable to muster the Unanimity required to overturn it. In our research on the question, we found that Unanimity is the decisionrule governing override in more than 90% of the rulings in the CGH data set. In the remaining cases, the decision-rule is a Qualified Majority [QM] , which CGH (440) operationalize as 70%
of the weighted votes of the MSGs in the Council of Ministers. Although CGH do not inform 16 Alter 1998; Cichowski 2007; Pollack 2003; Stone Sweet 2004 , 2010 Tallberg 2002a . To our knowledge, with the exception of Carrubba, Gabel and Hankla (2008) , no one since has argued that the threat of override is credible and might have a systemic impact on the ECJ"s rulings, though Garrett did not test the proposition.
readers of the fact, there is not one significant case of override in the history of adjudicating the treaties.
While everyone agrees that the ECJ seeks to elicit compliance with its decisions, there is also strong consensus for the view that the ECJ is not constrained in any systematic way by the threat of MSG non-compliance. The EU"s legal system, after all, has uniquely evolved in order to deal with compliance failures. 17 Over the past two decades, scholars have charted how noncompliance on the part of MSGs has organized litigation and provoked the Court"s dynamic construction of EU law (thereby creating new compliance failures). But no one has found that the progressive evolution of the ECJ"s case law, a truly remarkable edifice, has been stunted by the threat of non-compliance. In their article, CGH do not identify a single instance in which a threat of non-compliance has constrained the Court.
CGH"s claims flow from flawed theory and research design, not from evidence. In CGH"s account (439), the MSGs, not the ECJ, constitute the regime"s authoritative third-party enforcement mechanism. 18 The Court appears as a simple Agent, whose task is to ratify the MSGs" legal preferences on an ongoing basis, as such preferences are revealed. 19 CGH"s model denies the autonomy of the ECJ to make significant law, it also underestimates the supranational character of the system, in particular the crucial role of interactions between the ECJ and national judges. 20 CGH fail to appreciate the fact that it is national judges who do the bulk of supervision 17 Börzel, Hofmann, and Panke 2008; Kelemen 2006 Kelemen , 2010 Tallberg 2002b. 18 Stone Sweet, and Weiler, eds. 2008; Weiler 1994. of State compliance with EU law, and that it is national judges who work to "restore compliance," even in politically "sensitive" areas.
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In fact, the national courts (under Art. 267 TFEU) furnished nearly two-thirds of all of the legal questions in the CGH data set. The vast majority of these concern allegations of noncompliance brought to bar by individuals, firms, and interest groups. The national legal order is, in effect, the "defendant" in these cases. If, in its answers to the referring judge, the ECJ determines (or implies) that national law is in non-compliance with EU law, then it is the national judge, not the MSG, who will take the authoritative decision "to comply" or "not to comply." If a national judge sets aside national law, in deference to the ECJ"s case law, then how is it possible for a MSG to "implement" a decision "not to comply"? CGH do not tell us.
National judges implement the Court"s preliminary rulings routinely -far more than 90% of the time, 22 though CGH do not consider this fact in their account of how the legal system works.
- doctrine of supremacy, the rule that in every conflict between any EU legal norm and any national law or practice that arises before a national judge, the EU norm must prevail.
25
As noted above, a Trustee court possesses the capacity to expand or contract its own zone of discretion. The Treaty of Rome contained no supremacy clause, and the Member States did not provide for the direct effect of Treaty provisions or directives. Yet the Court, in collaboration with national judges, secured both. Deep, structural transformation of the regime was the result. As references from the national courts steadily rose, and then exploded, the ECJ found itself at the center of virtually every important policy question faced by Governments. As has been well-documented, the Court used these opportunities to jump-start market and political integration at crucial moments, and to maintain momentum in the face of inertia and doubt.
26
The consolidation of supremacy and direct effect is a necessary causal condition for this to
happen, yet the outcome is a theoretical impossibility in CGH"s model. Put differently, CGH have chosen to study a legal system that developed through rulings that unambiguously count as evidence against their own theory.
In the 1990s, political scientists adapted Stein"s method, to make it more rigorous and amenable to quantitative analysis. 27 Political scientists then began to use it, relatively systematically, within specific legal-policy domains, comparatively across domains, and diachronically. Well before CGH began their research, the method CGH claim to have originated had become standard in the field. Variations had been deployed in the projects that CGH explicitly criticize, 28 and others they do not cite. 29 The method was refined, in part, as a means of evaluating claims made, but left untested, by Garrett and Weingast 30 and Garrett. 31 These studies uniformly rejected Garrett and Weingast claims, though it is these propositions that CGH (437-38) now seek to revive.
CGH assert that their design "avoids" an inference problem that has rendered previous efforts to test the impact of briefs on ECJ rulings "uninformative" (436). CGH do not discuss how this problem has actually contaminated the findings of any specific piece of research.
26 For a recent review of the scholarly literature on the impact of the ECJ on integration, see . 27 Kilroy 1996; Stone Sweet and Caporaso 1998. 28 E.g., Stone Sweet 2004. 29 Including Cichowski 1998 Cichowski , 2004 Cichowski , 2007 McCown 2003; Nykios 2003. 30 Weingast and Garrett 1993 . 31 Instead, they confabulate (436): "Some scholars argue that observing governments taken to court regularly, ruled against regularly, and complying regularly is prima facie evidence that governments are constrained to obey adverse court rulings." To our knowledge, no scholar has ever argued this position. To state that the EU"s legal system processes non-compliance cases routinely, which it does, is not an assertion that MSGs "are constrained to obey adverse court rulings." On the contrary, (a) how the ECJ and the national courts decide non-compliance cases, and (b) how MSGs react to a finding of non-compliance by the courts, are two separate empirical questions, and have always been treated as such by scholars in this sub-field.
What is CGH"s method for avoiding the inference problems that have afflicted all extant scholarship? 32 The authors put it as follows:
[W]e develop a novel measurement strategy for coding court decisions. Decisions by the ECJ … often consist of multiple legal issues over which the court may not always favor the same side. Summarizing the decision as pro-plaintiff or prodefendant, which is common practice, therefore ignores potentially important variation in court behavior and, at a minimum, introduces measurement error. We avoid this problem by creating a dataset of decisions on within-case legal issues rather than cases themselves (CGH 436).
As described (here and in their coding protocol, which we reviewed), CGH"s method does not move beyond the basic approach developed post-Stein.
It is standard practice in this field to analyze the Court"s position on each legal question briefed by a MSG and the Commission, in each ruling analyzed. 33 For Article 267 preliminary rulings, this "issue-by-issue" approach is obligatory. In important cases, the national judge of reference typically asks more than one legal question. In responding, the ECJ often makes it clear which party in the dispute ought to prevail, given the facts and the ECJ"s interpretation of 32 CGH, 436: "This study will provide the first discriminating test of member-state government influence that avoids this observational equivalence problem." 33 E.g., Cichowski 2007; McCown 2003; Nykios 2003; Stone Sweet 2004. the applicable EU law; other times, the ECJ provides an interpretation on EU law, but leaves it to the national judge to decide how to apply it. Often, the ECJ does not answer all of the questions.
The issue of which party "wins" may be less important than how the Court interprets the law, in so far as such rulings will help to determine the future evolution of the system.
To illustrate, consider another momentous preliminary ruling: Costa (1964) . 34 The significance of the decision is not that the plaintiff, Mr. Costa, "lost," or that the defendant, an
Italian public utility, "won," though the ECJ dismissed the claim alleging Italian non- As others in the field did before them, CGH then use various statistical techniques to assess the relationship between briefs and rulings, in order to measure the extent to which ECJ"s rulings align with, or depart from, the net weighted position of the MSGs and the Commission brief. What is unusual and, in our view, indefensible, is that CGH count as support for their hypotheses every ECJ decision that is congruent with the net weighted position of the MSGs. In such cases, CGH assume that the ECJ was "constrained" to decide as it did, due to the threats of override and/or non-compliance. At most, CGH"s approach can test the "influence," or a "presumed persuasive effect," of briefs on outcomes; but it does not test the proposed explanation of this influence. If a court follows a line argued in one of the briefs submitted to it, why should the analyst believe that the outcome can only be explained with reference to one of two "political" threats? We submit that this approach would not make sense with respect any other legal system in which effective judicial review has been established, and it makes no sense for the EU.
The Hypotheses
The basic method CGH deploy is the best available method for testing their major claims.
It was developed, after all, for the express purpose of assessing whether the revealed preferences of MSGs, through threats and other mechanisms, constrain the ECJ"s decision-making in a 35 These rules governed the passage of EU statutes deemed necessary for the completion of the Common Market, pursuant to the Single European Act, which entered into force 1 July 1987.
systematic sense, as Garrett and Weingast, Garrett, and now CGH propose. Unfortunately, CGH do not actually test their hypotheses, as we will now demonstrate.
Hypothesis 1 embodies the override mechanism: "The more credible the threat of override … the more likely the court is to rule in favor of the governments" favored position"
(CGH 439). CGH further suggest, reasonably, that "the threat of legislative override increases with the likelihood that a sufficiently large coalition of member states would pursue legislation or treaty revision in response to an ECJ ruling" (440). CGH then load the dice in favor of their preferred position -that the threat of override is a credible one -by stipulating that the decisionrule governing override will always be QM. They justify this move as follows (440):
"Unfortunately, we cannot easily distinguish which legal issues can be overridden by QM and which require unanimity support." In fact, the information needed to determine the override rule is easily obtained: each ECJ ruling highlights, up-front, the provisions of EU law being litigated. 36 We examined every ruling pursuant to an infringement proceeding (Article 258), and every preliminary ruling (Article 267) in which at least one MSG filed an observation in the CGH data set. We found that, for over 90% of the cases, the override rule is Unanimity, not QM.
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CGH will not actually test Hypothesis 1, at least not as originally formulated. They choose not to stipulate a threshold point at which the threat of override can be assumed to have been registered. Further, they do not describe a single instance in which a threat of override was actually made, nor do they provide even a "stylized" example of how their mechanism might 36 In their coding protocol, CGH state that they coded the "legal basis" of the EU law being adjudicated by the Court. Legal basis, the rule governing adoption of a legal provision, determines the override rule. 37 The result is not surprising. The Unanimity override rule governs: all rulings on treaty law, including all cases in the domains of free movement of goods, services, and workers, anti-trust, and every legal basis dispute under Article 263; all rulings that concern EU legislation adopted under unanimity rules, the vast majority of statutes litigated in CGH"s data set; all rulings pursuant to Article 267 preliminary questions related to direct effect, supremacy, remedies, and general principles of EU law, including fundamental rights; and more.
work. Instead, CGH (436) declare that the necessary votes to override can be garnered through "log-rolling." The entire discussion of "log-rolling" occurs in the following passage (436):
"Override requires a government, or set of governments, opposed to the Court"s preferred ruling to cobble together a logroll. Further, protocols can ease the logrolling process in treaty revision."
In fact, CGH assume that the necessary votes can be "cobbled" together so long as the net weight of observations filed in support of a defendant Member State is greater than zero. Although Hypothesis 1, as originally stated, implied that the threat of override would only be registered when a "sufficiently large coalition" of MSGs weighed in, CGH go on to treat the threat as present even in cases when only one MSG, as small as Luxembourg or Portugal, has filed a brief.
The move fundamentally conflicts with the Intergovernmentalist theory they claim to embrace;
Garrett stresses that only the most powerful states can constrain the Court.
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With respect to non-compliance, CGH (439) Börzel, Hofman, and Panke (2008) collected comprehensive data on Article 258 actions and outcomes for the 1978-99 period, a time-frame that subsumes CGH"s data. The Commission brought more than 5,000 proceedings against Member States, the vast majority of which were settled before a ruling, after the defendant State agreed to change its law or practices. The Commission referred to the Court one-third of all cases (n=1,646), leading to a final ECJ judgment in slightly less than half of these (n=808). The ECJ found against the Member States in 95% of its Article 258 rulings, suggesting why the settlement regime is so effective. In "about 100 cases," the Commission brought a second action after the defendant Member State failed to comply with the ECJ"s ruling. These cases either were then settled to the Commission"s satisfaction, or the ECJ found against the MS a second time. Stone Sweet (2004) We now turn to the data on Article 267 activity, in which the Court responds to questions referred by national judges. CGH code 2,048 legal questions answered in 1209 rulings. In the majority of legal questions raised (1122/2048), either no MSG filed a brief, or CGH coded the net weighted position as zero. There are, in fact, only 6 instances in which MSGs took a net weighted position against the plaintiff-individual that reaches at least 50% of a vote under the QM procedure (the plaintiff "wins" in three of these cases, and "loses" in three). In each of these cases, however, the rule governing override was Unanimity, not QM. In only one Article 234 ruling (of 1209), does a coalition of MSGs reach as many as 6 of the 12 to 15 votes necessary to override the Court. CGH do not report this information, but instead expect readers to believe that a "log-rolling" process, left unexplained, can "cobble together" the necessary votes. Now let us consider the data as a whole. Figure 1 depicts (338), the threat of override is not credible, then it cannot constrain the ECJ. CGH"s claim to the contrary is inexplicable.
---- Figure 1 here -----Given the paucity of evidence in support of their theory, what did CGH find that led them to over claim so much? CGH are able to demonstrate only that when MSGs weigh in on an issue, the ECJ will, more often than not, decide the question in ways that are congruent with that weighting; their design does not test the robustness of the proposed mechanisms (the threat of override and non-compliance respectively).
When MSGs side with the plaintiff (n=375, typically, urging the Court to find against laws and practices in place in another State), the MSG"s rate of success is 70.9%. When MSGs side with the defendant (n=646, typically against the Commission or an individual, and in support of another State"s law and practices), their rate of success is 58.5%. The MSG"s success rate is far higher when they encourage the ECJ (to punish a Member State) than when they seek to constrain the Court (from finding against a defendant States" law and practices), though
MSGs participates in the latter activity far more than in the former. There is a fundamental difference between situations in which (a) MSGs ask the Court not to develop EU law in new directions, and (b) MSGs urge the Court to find against a defendant State on the basis of common understandings of EU law. In the first, MSGs seek to constrain the Court, in the second they enable it. CGH"s design does not distinguish between these two situations.
Qualitative Evidence
CGH restrict their inquiry to statistical analysis of the coded rulings. In contrast to others in the field, CGH do not supplement statistical findings with thicker, descriptive analyses of the relationship between non-compliance and judicial process. Using CGH"s approach, of course, the analyst cannot distinguish between a profoundly important legal question, and a minor one.
Whereas others took care to examine how prior case law (argumentation and precedent) structures litigation, identifying those rulings that are most important in generating future streams of litigation, CGH treat all issues and all rulings as if they were equally significant, and they do not follow-up on any ruling in their data set. Most important, CGH do not engage the extant literature on Member State non-compliance, 46 nor do they identify a single attempt on the part of the Member States to override the ECJ.
In fact, the data set contains two instances in which MSGs formally sought to constrain the ECJ pursuant to major rulings, rulings that must count as evidence against CGH"s theory. The Commission sided with the Royal Society, arguing that economic interests could only be "ancillary" to "ornithological criteria" in any decision to classify an area as a protected zone. France, supporting the UK, argued that the Member States "must be guided by considerations of an economic nature in carrying out their obligations to create SPAs." In its ruling (Lappel Bank, 1996) , the Court bluntly rejected France and the UK"s briefed arguments:
"a Member State is not authorized to take account of the economic requirements … when designating an SPA and defining its boundaries." Citing to Leybucht Dykes and other cases, it held that economic requirements could never rise to "a general interest superior to that represented by the ecological objective" of the Wild Birds Directive, and that the 1992 amendment did not apply to "classification of an area as an SPA." The House of Lords therefore held that the Government had acted illegally, and it was ordered to pay the Royal Society"s costs, some 140,000 pounds. 55 In this saga, MSGs succeeded in reversing the Court"s interpretation of an important statute, but the ECJ overrode the override.
Finally, the CGH data set contains a set of landmark constitutional rulings ranking in importance with those analyzed by Stein. In Francovich (1991) , 56 the Court announced the doctrine of state liability. In this ruling, the Court held that a Member State can be held financially responsible for damages caused to private parties for failure to transpose or implement an EU directive. The issue of state liability was extensively debated. Italy, Netherlands, and the UK filed briefs, supported by Germany in oral argument, asserting, among other things, that since the Treaty says nothing on the question, the new remedy must be provided for, if at all, in EU legislation, not through judicial fiat. Comforting the Commission"s position, the Court rejected the Member States" arguments:
The possibility of obtaining redress from the Member State is particularly indispensable where, as in this case, the full effectiveness of Community rules is subject to prior action on the part of the State and where, consequently, in the absence of such action, individuals cannot enforce before the national courts the rights conferred upon them by Community law. It follows that the principle whereby a State must be liable for loss and damage caused to individuals as a result of breaches of Community law for which the State can be held responsible is inherent in the system of the Treaty [emphasis added].
As subsequently extended in Brasserie du Pecheur (1996) , 57 individuals and firms are entitled to reparation when any EU legal norm is "intended to confer rights upon them, the breach is sufficiently serious, and there is a direct causal link between the breach and the damage These cases have provoked a complex process of adaptation, on the part of national legal orders, accompanied by a steady case load to the Court.
The outcomes of these three episodes conflict with CGH"s model of how the legal system works, while fitting comfortably the models they dismiss. These lines of case law have another quality in common. Each involves judicial lawmaking that congealed as a precedent-based, doctrinal framework which, in turn, organized future litigation that would propel the system forward. Such dynamics are inexplicable under CGH"s theory.
Analysis (2): The Brief for Intergovernmentalism and Neofunctionalism
In their paper, CGH attempt to revive the contest between Intergovernmentalist and Neofunctionalist theories of integration as applied to the EU"s legal system.
CGH claim (449) that the data support Intergovernmentalism claims to the effect that the threats of override and non-compliance "have large, systematic, and substantively significant effects on judicial decision making"; but, they argue, the evidence conflicts with Neofunctionalism which, they state, holds that "while these constraints might matter on the margin, the court has had the latitude to pursue an agenda independent of and contrary to MSGs the outcome of infringement proceedings to be a fair test of their claim. 59 We therefore examine what"s left: rulings generated through the Article 267 preliminary reference procedure.
58 Burley and Mattli 1993; Stone Sweet 2004. 59 To explain away why "the Court should not typically face threats of override" in the Article 258 setting, CGH (436) state that "the Commission normally brings an infringement charge against a member state on questions where a clear legal principle has emerged based on a series of previous cases. In other words, the Commission"s position is normally based on an interpretation of EU law that has survived multiple opportunities for member states to challenge or amend it via legislative override." This argument resembles a Neofunctionalist, not an Intergovernmentalist, position: the Court builds the law that the Commission exploits in the service of its own policy agenda. In fact, it is often the case that the Commission brings actions in order to induce the ECJ to build the law in a progressive fashion, and the ECJ responds positively, a dynamic that CGH do not consider. If the Article 258 system actually worked the way the CGH claim, then the Court"s case law of "clear legal principles" would not have emerged in the first place, since such principles are commonly built on findings of non-compliance in cases in which Member States rarely file observations; the Court should have been constrained in CGH"s model.
Of the 2,048 questions on which the ECJ rendered a preliminary ruling, the Commission filed observations in 77.7% (n=1588), whereas the Member States produced a weighted position in 45.2% (n=926). In these cases, the Commission"s success rate is far more impressive than that of the Member States. When the Commission takes the Plaintiff"s side (n=841), the Court rules in favor of the plaintiff 79.9% of the time, a result to be compared to the Member States lower 70.8% success rate in fewer cases (n=342). When the Commission files observations against the Plaintiff (n=747), the ECJ rules in favor of the defendant 77.7% of the time, to be compared to the Member States far lower 57.2% success rate in fewer cases (n=584).
---- Tables 1 and 2 ---- Table 3 here -----
In an observation for the Plaintiff, the Defendant, or no observation at all.
---- Table 4 Commission is neutral and, on balance, the MSGs favor the Defendant, the coefficient takes on a positive value, which indicates that more cases are being decided for the Plaintiff; yet, the variable is not statistically significant. In sum, when the Commission takes a position on how a legal question should be decided, the Court tends to comfort that position, in a statistically significant way, even when the MSGs prefer the opposite outcome. But when the Commission takes no position on how a legal question ought to be decided, we find no statistically significant evidence that the ECJ favors the side preferred by the Governments.
Thus, using CGH"s own data, method, and their preferred theoretical constructions of integration theory, we reject each of CGH"s major claims. The threat of override has not constrained the ECJ in any systematic sense, because the threat is not credible. Compliance failures, far from bringing the system to a standstill, feed and maintain a system whose expansive dynamics continued unabated throughout the period CGH chose to study. Last, in a head-tohead showdown, the Commission (and Neofunctionalism) dominates the MSGs (and Intergovernmentalism) as a predictor of ECJ rulings. In sum, our findings strongly confirm results produced by more than a decade of empirical scholarship, research that had disconfirmed the theoretical positions 61 CGH seek to revive.
Conclusion: Trusteeship in International Regimes
See the paper:
"Trustee Courts and the Evolution of International Regimes: The Politics of Majoritarian Activism in the ECHR, the EU, and the WTO," available on SSRN.
BOXED INSERT: THE JURISDICTION OF THE ECJ
The CGH data set contains information collected from ECJ rulings rendered during an 11-year period (January 1, 1987 to December 31, 1997). These cases came to the Court under three provisions of the Treaty of Rome. Since December 1, 2009, these provisions appear in the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU).
Under Article 258 TFEU, the Commission may initiate "infringement proceedings" -also called "enforcement actions" -against a Member State for non-compliance with EC law; rounds of negotiation ensue; if these fail, the Commission may refer the matter to the ECJ for decision. The Commission"s discretion to bring such suits is absolute. In Article 258 litigation, the defendant is always a Member State, and the plaintiff is always the Commission.
Under Article 263 TFEU, the ECJ presides over "annulment actions," suits brought by private parties seeking to invalidate decisions of the EU"s governing bodies. In this litigation, only the EU"s institutions can ever be defendants; the Member States can never be defendants, and national compliance with EU law is never an issue before the Court.
Under Article 267 TFEU, national judges send questions -preliminary references -to the ECJ in order to obtain an interpretation of EU law, when the latter is material to the resolution of a dispute at national bar. The ECJ responds in the form of a judgment -a preliminary ruling -that the referring judge is expected to apply to resolve the case. The vast majority of these cases involve an allegation, on the part of a private party (an individual, firm, or interest group), that a specific national law, or practice permitted or required under national law, is in non-compliance with EU law. If the allegation is upheld, the national judge is expected to give priority to EU law, while setting aside conflicting national law (the doctrine of supremacy). 
